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ABSTRACT 
The Internet of Things is an emerging global infrastructure that employs wireless 
sensors to collect, store, and exchange data. Increasingly, applications for marketing 
and advertising have been articulated as a means to enhance the consumer shopping 
experience, in addition to improving efficiency. However, privacy advocates have 
challenged the mass aggregation of personally-identifiable information in databases and 
geotracking, the use of location-based services to identify one’s precise location over 
time. This paper employs the framework of contextual integrity related to privacy 
developed by Nissenbaum (2010) as a tool to understand citizens in Hawaii’s response 
to specific implementations of Internet of Things-related technologies.  The purpose of 
the study was to identify and understand specific changes in information practices that 
will be brought about by the Internet of Things that may be perceived as privacy 
violations.  Specifically, what changes in actors, attributes, and transmission principle 
related to the Internet of Things can be identified, and what do these reveal about 
underlying norms? Eight citizens were interviewed, read a scenario of near-term 
Internet of Things implementations in the supermarket, and were asked to reflect on 
changes in the key actors involved, information attributes, principles of transmission.  
Areas where new practices occur with the Internet of Things were then highlighted as 
potential problems (privacy violations).  Issues identified included the mining of medical 
data, invasive targeted advertising, and loss of autonomy through marketing profiles or 
personal affect monitoring.  While there were numerous aspects deemed desirable by 
the participants, some developments appeared to tip the balance between consumer 
benefit and corporate gain. Their surveillance power creates an imbalance between the 
consumer and the corporation that may also impact individual autonomy. The policy 
implications of these findings are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet of Things is an emerging infrastructure that employs radio frequency 
identification (RFID), near field communication (NFC), and related technologies to 
“enable the Internet to reach out into the real world of physical objects” (Internet of 
Things Conference, 2010). There is not a single definition for the Internet of Things – 
rather, it describes a variety of developments in which everyday objects can be tagged, 
and using standards enabling unique identification, communicate over the Internet.  
Weber and Weber (2010) see the Internet of Things as a “backbone for ubiquitous 
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computing, enabling smart environments to recognize and identify objects, and retrieve 
information from the Internet to facilitate their adaptive functionality” (p. 1). Thus, it can 
be seen as a global architecture permitting enhanced intelligence to facilitate the 
exchange of goods and services.  In addition to networking objects for supply chain 
management, the ubiquitous integration of tags and sensor networks may also be 
employed in smart appliances, smart homes, and in-vivo health applications. 
Visions of the Internet of Things rely, in part, on the rapid increase in the amount of data 
collected and exchanged due to an explosion in the number of communication devices, 
what The European Commission Information Society and Media (2008) refers to as a 
“data deluge” (p. 6). These data are increasingly being used in the manipulation of 
personal information, or “dataveillance” (Clarke, 1988), in business intelligence and 
consumer marketing, and the Internet of Things will potentially magnify this trend. 
Further, the goals of Internet of Things development include empowering computers 
“with their own means of gathering information, so they can see, hear and smell the 
world for themselves, in all its random glory. RFID and sensor technology enable 
computers to observe, identify and understand the world—without the limitations of 
human-entered data” (Ashton, 2009, para. 5).  Thus, the potential impacts of automated 
data gathering and data mining must also be considered.  
These developments are being marketed to citizens and governments as a means 
toward greater efficiency, safety, and convenience, as well as an important enabler for 
developing new services with user-generated content.  In addition to the data deluge, 
RFID makes it possible to harvest a wide array of new data types, enabling data mining 
to predict consumer behavior, improve supply chain management, and monitor other 
aspects of the physical environment. However, a great deal of concern has been 
generated about privacy issues related to the Internet of Things and related 
technologies. Opponents highlight issues such as the mass aggregation of personally-
identifiable information in databases and geotracking, the use of location-based 
services to identify one’s precise location over time.   
Although the surveillance potential of modern information and communication 
technologies is widely acknowledged, The Internet of Things poses several unique 
challenges to privacy. First, because many of its components are small and not 
necessarily visible, one potentially does not know when and where data is being 
collected. This complicates regulatory or technical schemes that rely on consumer 
consent.  Second, because billions of everyday objects, or even the human body itself, 
can be equipped with sensors, there are many new types of data that can be collected. 
Patterns can be sought in information that was previously not analyzed. Further, 
machine intelligence may be used to both collect and analyze these data. Third, 
because it is part of a global Internet-based system, data can potentially be aggregated 
and linked to other personally-identifiable records. Increasingly, global flows of 
information make it possible for this personal data to be accessed by a variety of 
sources. These attributes have led to growing recognition of a need for technical 
standards and governance to “build trust and confidence in these novel technologies 
rather than increasing fears of total surveillance scenarios” (The European Commission 
Information Society and Media, 2008, p.3) 
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When considering the Internet of Things, it is important to acknowledge that it is an 
emerging environment that cannot be explicitly examined in situ. However, it is not 
entirely “in the future”.  Importantly, Dourish and Bell (2011) point out that infrastructures 
are messy and in constant flux – “thinking of infrastructure as stable, uniform, seamless, 
and universally available is clearly problematic” (pp. 28-29). The framework for the 
Internet of Things already exists and features of it are already employed in limited ways. 
1.1  PRIVACY AND LEGAL CONCERNS 
While privacy is often acknowledged a human right, there is no consensus about what 
privacy entails or how it can be adequately addressed in policy and law. Because there 
will be marked changes in the types of data collected, the amount of data collected, and 
the analyses used to exploit it, the Internet of Things is certain to be a hotbed of privacy 
concerns. At national or regional levels, the Internet of Things is becoming integral to 
information and communication technology (ICT) policy initiatives, and privacy concerns 
are being addressed in various ways. In 2010, China’s Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) announced plans to make the Internet of Things a key 
component of IT policy and intends to strengthen relevant financial and taxation 
measures (“China working on unified national Internet of Things strategic plan”, 2010 
July 5); however, there is as of yet no specific legal protection. In contrast, the 
European Union has long had a comprehensive data protection scheme and, in 
conjunction with its resolution to support Internet of Things development, recently 
formally addressed privacy concerns about the Internet of Things, adopting an 
agreement called the Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for 
RFID Applications as a means to safeguard citizen privacy (O’Connor, 2011).   
In the United States, there is no comprehensive law protecting consumer privacy. At the 
federal level, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1986) does not adequately 
address modern information technologies, data aggregation and exchange, and novel 
information practices.  Instead, United States citizens must rely largely on corporate 
self-regulation and a number of sector-specific privacy laws (e.g., health records). This 
has not been successful in allaying concern: In December of 2010, the Federal Trade 
Commission released a report on proposals for consumer privacy (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2010), and growing concern about abuse of consumer records has 
recently led to proposals in Congress to reform the 1986 Act.   
Weber and Weber (2010) note the legal challenges surrounding privacy and Internet of 
Things development. A first question is whether there is a need for laws to govern these 
changes or if business self-regulation will suffice. Then, if legislation is the chosen path, 
are existing laws sufficient?  Finally, if new laws are needed, “what kind of laws are 
required and what is the time frame for their implementation?” (p. 52).  
It is important to consider that blanket approaches that rely on a dichotomy between 
“public” and “private” data may fail to account for certain instances where citizens feel 
their privacy expectations have been violated. This paper addresses how we can better 
foster the development of new systems, practices, and policies that support citizens’ 
rights to privacy.  Following Kling (2000) and Nissenbaum (2010), it is argued that new 
technologies such as the Internet of Things are not necessarily positive or negative but 
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must be viewed in specific context. The framework of contextual integrity related to 
privacy developed by Nissenbaum (2010) is employed as a tool to understand citizens 
in Hawaii’s concerns about Internet of Things-related technologies.  Specifically, the 
purpose of the study is to identify and understand specific changes in information 
practices that will be brought about by the Internet of Things and may be perceived as 
privacy violations by citizens and to reflect on the underlying norms that shape their 
perceptions.   
1.2 THE FRAMEWORK OF CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY 
Nissenbaum (2010) describes the right to privacy not as a right to secrecy or control, 
but to “appropriate flow of personal information” or contextual integrity (p. 127).  
Addressing Facebook executive Mark Zuckerberg’s claim that privacy is no longer a 
social norm (Barnett, 11 Jan 2010), she proposes the framework in order to guide 
assessment of new practices arising from technical systems. The question becomes, do 
novel practices “violate context-relative informational norms?” (p. 148). To address this, 
a comparison must be made between the existing practice and the new practice. In 
particular, changes in key actors, types of data collected, and principles of transmission, 
are explored. Finally, “if the new practice generates changes in actors, attributes, or 
transmission principles, the practice is flagged as violating entrenched informational 
norms and constitutes a prima facie violation of contextual integrity.” (p. 150). Once this 
has been ascertained, ethical factors affected by the new practice are considered in 
light of the specific context. Thus, the framework of contextual integrity is useful in 
understanding people’s reactions to information technologies reshaping personal 
information flows and can be helpful in explaining resistance and fear in response to 
these changes. This information can then be used to inform system design and policy. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
This study seeks to identify normative conflicts related to the consumer in-store 
supermarket experience in the context of the Internet of Things.  The supermarket is 
chosen for analysis because it is a site for a constellation of everyday tasks that are not 
typically associated with a great deal of privacy concern.  Furthermore, information 
exchanges in this context are not, at present, explicitly protected by federal privacy 
laws. To explore citizens’ perception about context-specific norms of privacy related to 
the in-store shopping experience, in-person, semi-structured interviews were 
administered.  Interviews were employed so that the same sets of questions could be 
used in each interview, while allowing the flexibility to follow important paths.   
Participants were elicited based on their status as citizens of the State of Hawaii, having 
visited a supermarket during the past month, and being users of location-based services 
on a mobile device. As the Internet of Things is an emerging infrastructure and present 
location-based services are seen as an important component of it, some familiarity with 
the types of services discussed was seen as advantageous. In addition, participants 
were selected to reflect a variety of perspectives based on age, ethnicity, gender and 
occupation. Recruitment was performed online and on a volunteer basis. 
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The development of interview questions and analysis was guided by the analytic 
framework of contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2010). Participants were first asked to 
anchor their responses to a recent supermarket visit.  Interview questions then sought 
to gain insight into their perception of information attributes, what types of data they 
thought might have been collected about them during this visit. This included when they 
arrived, if they were there with any other individuals, what they looked at or touched, 
and what they bought. A second set of questions asked participants about the actors 
involved, who they thought had observed these behaviors (human or electronic), and 
who had access to it or handled this information.  Other questions addressed principles 
of transmission, whether data was recorded and how it was transmitted.  Once the 
existing practices and expectations were discussed, the participants read a short 
scenario describing a visit to the supermarket in the year 2021. The scenario was drawn 
from a variety of global Internet of Things developments, including present research 
initiatives and corporate visions, and described the participant visiting the same store 
that they answered questions about in the first part. After they completed the scenario, a 
final set of questions addressed changes to the existing practices (and expectations) of 
privacy.  Areas where new practices occurred with the Internet of Things were then 
highlighted as potential privacy violations and these areas were discussed to probe for 
underlying norms.   
Interviews were recorded with a digital audio recorder, transcribed, and in some cases, 
clarifying questions were asked of participants to review for accuracy, strengthening 
objectivity and credibility. Qualitative analysis of the complete transcripts was used to 
develop themes as they emerged.  Transcripts were analyzed and inductively coded 
using ATLAS.ti Scientific Software. After coding was finalized, data were summarized 
thematically. 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A total of eight participants representing both genders, and a variety of age groups, 
occupations, and ethnicities were interviewed. All participants resided on the island of 
Oahu and were therefore residents of the City & County of Honolulu. Table 1 provides a 
summary of participants. (Pseudonyms are used to protect their identities). 
3.1  EXISTING PRACTICES/EXPECTATIONS 
Participants uniformly described their visit to the supermarket as a routine shopping 
experience where they examined and purchased a variety of items.  However, 
interviewees were varied in their expectations of current information practices. The 
majority suggested that they felt only store employees or other customers might be 
aware of their arrival or movement throughout the store. However, three participants 
recalled surveillance cameras. Maile suggested that “If they really wanted to they could 
go back and check the camera footage.”  Kepano and Kainoa indicated that they were 
aware of constant video surveillance from the moment they entered the store, as theft 
deterrent or to investigate security issues, as well as for possible review for marketing 
strategies. Kepano observed, “I’m sure they keep those videotapes around for a while, 
and I’m sure they’re using it for more than just saving my face in case I rob the place.” 
Kainoa explained that he had previously worked in a supermarket and that he believes 
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that surveillance footage may be combed for marketing purposes related to consumer 
behavior. Participants acknowledged that affiliates, such as manufacturers, might have 
access to limited data.  However, it was emphasized that this should not be linked to 
specific individuals. There was the expectation that, even though they were in a public 
place where they might encounter people they knew, their purchases were relatively 
private.  
All interviewees noted owning a rewards card, and in all but one case, such a card was 
used during the visit in question. There was consensus that information about the items 
they bought was likely stored in some type of electronic database and would be linked 
to their identity.  There was consensus that use of the rewards card represented an 
agreement to share limited personal information in exchange for lower prices, special 
offers and coupons, and more customized suggestions. All believed that the present 
intent of this gathering was to create a customized experience for the user and to make 
business operations more efficient in a way that benefitted the consumer – “an 
acceptable balance”, as Nalani described it. Maka, Anuhea, and Kepano mentioned that 
it would be inappropriate for any of the information gathered about their activities in the 
store to be used outside the corporation with the exception of law enforcement in the 
case of criminal investigations. Kainoa indicated it would be inappropriate for any 
information to be shared outside the immediate store location. Further, while all agreed 
that the store might employ some type of analytic technique to improve 
recommendations or product placement, participants felt that this should involve data 
stripped of unique identifiers.  
3.1 CONFLICTS WITH NOVEL PRACTICES RELATED TO THE INTERNET OF 
THINGS 
3.1.1 LOCATION-BASED SERVICES  
A number of changes in the types of data collected, actors involved, and transmission 
techniques led to concerns by the participants.  Location-based services were the 
component of the Internet of Things that was most salient to participants, since they 
already had personal experience with these tools and an awareness of related current 
events, for example recent news stories about Apple and Google using location-based 
applications on smartphones (e.g., Albanesius, 2011).  Although all participants willingly 
used location-based services in some form on their present mobile device, there was a 
great deal of concern about who would have access to this data in the future. Proposed 
services that might announce who is in a store at a given time or seek to provide other 
social networking services during in-store visits were seen as extremely unwelcome. 
Concern about targeted communications arose as well, as several participants 
mentioned that they worried that unknown corporate affiliates might reach out to them 
based on location-based services linked to personal profiles and that these targeted 
advertisements might be unwanted or difficult to manage. Marx (2006) argues that 
location-based information is particularly sensitive because it can both identify an 
individual and monitor movement over time.  
The substantive information it provides can be compared to predictive models (or 
used to build them) that then serve to direct how the individual is responded to…. 
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But it also offers a means of action – knowing where the person is may permit 
‘reaching’ them, either literally, as with 911 responders, or through targeted 
communications. (pp. 97-98)    
In addition to corporate sharing of the data, there was also concern that others could 
access it through illegal means, leading to fears of stalkers or theft.  Keoni worried that 
unauthorized people might gain access to this information and be able to use it in real-
time for burglaries: “they know you’re not in your house so they could target you…”   
Anuhea and Maka mentioned that, even with laws requiring protection of data, there is 
the potential for theft or hacking.   
Maile expressed concern that people might be willing to share location-based data with 
others initially, but that this could have unintended consequences: 
And I hope it’s just not a negative view to take but I do specifically remember that 
a friend told me that it’s the greatest thing even that he could find his friends 
walking down the street and I thought “don’t you think that’s crazy? I wouldn’t 
want someone to know that about me. I mean, he hadn’t thought about it… and 
realizing that a lot of people do walk right into that, thinking, “oh, it’s not so 
bad…”  
Several participants raised the fear of stalking, particularly by those who might be 
acquaintances. Perhaps relationships would change over time, or there would be 
subtleties in the information one would willingly share.  On a related note, another 
theme that emerged was concern about deception in communication.  Kainoa 
emphasized that one’s location is personal and he admitted to lying on occasion when 
people call to ask where he is. Similarly, both Kainoa and Maka described incidents 
where they saw an acquaintance while shopping and quickly moved to avoid being 
seen. Deception, including altruistic lying, is a part of everyday communication 
(DePaulo & Kashy, 1998); and as Dourish and Bell (2011) point out, this will become 
increasingly difficult in a ubiquitous communication environment.   
3.1.2 TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency was a key issue, both as it relates to what data is being collected and 
who has access to it.  Kainoa explained that “it’s not really clear what they say about 
their corporate affiliates. That can be anybody. I wouldn’t want information going to the 
government. I wouldn’t want it going anywhere, to be honest… My biggest discomfort is 
knowing that my data is stored somewhere and it’s not going to go away. I can’t get it 
off. I might not know where it is.” Similarly, Keoni pointed out that it would not 
necessarily have negative consequences. However, the uncertainty troubled him: “I 
don’t see that that’s necessarily a bad thing, but they are gathering it and I just don’t 
know who has it… it’s like you just don’t know to what use this information is to be put.”  
In Turow’s (2006) analysis of customer relationship media, he observed that marketers 
and advertisers are trying to find ways to “insert themselves unfiltered into their desired 
customers’ domestic lives in ways that encourage consumers to accept surveillance and 
relationships tailored to their personal characteristics” (p. 295). Direct marketing, 
product placement, customized media, and loyalty programs are all converging to 
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enhance marketers’ and advertisers’ surveillance power. At the same time, these 
“seemingly benign relationships in the new digital environment can quickly lead to 
feelings of discrimination, anger, and suspicion of institutions” (p. 303).  Haggerty and 
Ericson (2006) note that surveillance enables monitoring pre-constituted social 
groupings, with the logic of a particular system subjecting individuals to varying levels of 
scrutiny. 
3.1.3 HEALTH-RELATED INFORMATION 
Concern about health-related information emerged as a major theme. There was 
recognition that a great deal of personal information, related to both one’s health and 
identity (including sexual, religious, or cultural practices) might be inferred from one’s 
aggregate data. Although going to the supermarket is an “ordinary” and public 
occurrence, according to Anuhea, electronic monitoring, storing, and analysis of data 
gathered during routine excursions can be highly personal. She noted, 
I can’t see myself buying anything unusual, but if I do, I don’t want to have that 
be a judgment later on. I see a trend for women, maybe you’re buying certain 
feminine products and then you stop buying them, so maybe they know you’re 
hitting a certain age. I mean, that’s personal information that maybe you don’t 
want to share. 
While store employees or other patrons might witness a consumer making a sensitive 
purchase, the aggregation and mining of the data allows for historical patterns to be 
identified and stored. 
Kepano also expressed concern about his purchase information being transmitted to 
other parties. While, in the United States, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA) prevents specific actors from sharing health 
information about an individual, other actors not explicitly covered could amass and 
analyze data: 
… if I’ve got a health issue and I’m buying donuts, you know… my rates may go 
up, they may drop me. I don’t drink but I may buy a bottle of wine or buy 
cigarettes… I do that all the time for a friend. I don’t smoke, never have... If that 
started getting linked to my health organizations, to my insurance… I’ve told my 
life insurance I don’t smoke or drink. If they start getting the idea that I do smoke 
and drink, well, my rates are going to go up. 
This raises the concern that erroneous personal data could be linked to an individual. 
Haggerty and Ericson (2006) highlight the likelihood of error in personal profiles of 
aggregated databases. Solove (2011) also points out that data mining is prone to 
inaccuracies. Further, it might also enable targeting based on First Amendment-
protected activities. Equality is thereby challenged, as information about race, ethnicity, 
religion, or political views can be inferred.  Further, ubiquitous gathering and sharing of 
data would make transparency difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. One would not be 
aware of what information is being stored about them, be able to correct factual errors, 
or delete information deemed invasive.  Recent news stories have demonstrated the 
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commercial value of such information. For example, the Nielsen Corporation, a global 
advertising and marketing company, was caught harvesting private medical postings 
from behind a password-protected forum dedicated to discussion of patients’ medical 
conditions (Angwin & Stecklow, 12 October 2010).  There is also evidence that data 
aggregators are developing technology that “matches people's real names to the 
pseudonyms they use on blogs, Twitter and other social networks” (para. 20). This 
targeted surveillance would represent a major shift in power, in which corporations 
would be provided with a view-all of consumer behavior without a corresponding 
increase in benefits to the consumer. This has the potential to lead to discriminatory 
behavior on the part of corporations, who might offer different products, or prices, to 
individuals based on advertiser-generated profiles (Turow, 2006). 
3.1.4 BIOMETRIC DATA 
In addition to the potential for networked sensors to be placed in or on the body in order 
to monitor specific medical conditions such as diabetes, participants expressed concern 
about monitoring shoppers’ facial expressions or eye movement.  Anxiety about the 
analysis of facial expressions and affect identification was raised in four interviews. 
Maka described his concern that cameras linked to facial recognition systems capable 
of analyzing both identity and microexpressions could be repositioned to examine his 
behavior based on what products he looked at or touched: 
Reading your microexpressions, your expressions, and understanding how you 
really feel about this product even thought you might not know it yourself. So 
that’s a little spooky, plus they know your feelings, your personal feelings rather 
than just what you’re purchasing… that’s creepy. And just the pervasiveness of 
all of it… It’s like mining your thoughts more than just your buying habits. 
In the supermarket context, there have already been technical developments and 
marketing experiments seeking to accomplish this very thing. Emotion-recognition 
software has been developed and tested to examine consumers’ reactions to 
advertisements and products on billions of devices (e.g., nViso, 2011). In 2003, a Wal-
Mart store in Oklahoma used RFID in cosmetic packages to trigger video cameras in-
store to observe and record consumers, an act met with outrage by privacy advocates 
(Hildner, 2006). Iolana also noted that even if she were somehow able to avoid sharing 
or use false information about her identity to make purchases, facial recognition 
technologies could still link all of her behaviors to an actual identity profile.  There would 
be no way to opt-out of sharing this information. Facial recognition technologies are 
currently under study by the Federal Trade Commission due to consumer privacy 
concern (Federal Trade Commission, 2011).  
3.1.5 AUTONOMY AND IDENTITY  
All eight of the participants saw certain aspects of Internet of Things developments as 
welcome conveniences but also expressed concern that they could lead to invasive 
targeted marketing. A primary concern was that advertisers with access to stores of 
personal data, browsing and purchasing trends, and one’s location might seek to 
influence consumer behaviors in an unwelcome manner.  Keoni said that, “I don’t see 
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that that’s harmful per se, but it seems somewhat intrusive. Somewhat driven by 
companies looking for information about you, and once you’ve even thought about their 
product, that there’s a push for you to purchase it.” Kainoa was more reluctant, noting, 
“It’s like people are rats on wheels being directed what to do by their phone.” Maka 
added that “I think for myself I’d like it to know as little as possible about me. I can make 
my own decisions.” This was echoed by Maile, who observed that, 
I think underneath it all that the concern would be that there is too much 
information about your identity going out and how is it really linking you to other 
people and other places because I don’t necessarily want people to know my 
habits… and I can live without the store telling me that I need to come back.   
Essentially, these are concerns about freedom and autonomy. Furthermore, consumers’ 
constant awareness of, and interaction with, these profiles could limit individual choices. 
Haggerty and Ericson (2006) note that surveillance can foster the establishment of new 
forms of identity, with new identity categories being created by advertisers. One’s 
position in this “new constellation of market segments” determines the commercial 
offers and communication one receives (p. 16).  Increasingly, consumers could be 
influenced by these messages in ways that limit their own abilities to shape their 
identities.  
3.1.6 PUBLIC SPACES AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
Although the supermarket is considered a public space, it is also a bridge to one’s home 
life, which is presumably not open to the public gaze.  Because the Internet of Things is 
expected to link a variety of household objects, including refrigerators and other 
appliances, to global networks, the home itself may become a site of surveillance linked 
to the supermarket. This would enhance the likelihood of information related to sensitive 
issues such as medicine, religion, political views, and so forth being captured or 
exchanged.  Through surveillance, the supermarket is transformed from a mundane 
place, where one has an expectation of privacy to a site of surveillance, highlighting the 
blurring boundary between public and private space.  Anuhea elaborated this idea with 
an example from the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in 
Honolulu. She described a news release about a company interested in embedding the 
pavement in Waikiki with sensors, in order to detect the presence of individuals and 
move surveillance cameras accordingly.  
It’s putting a new spin on public life. And public space… You think you’re just 
going around doing your average chores in daily life… Because if I go to a public 
space there’s an awareness that you’re going to be filmed perhaps, but if I am 
just going to the grocery store doing my daily chores I have an expectation that 
it’s more private. So I guess if you’re looking at saying it’s for the public good for 
events like that, it’s interesting... I don’t know if it makes me feel comfortable but 
it probably does make the job easier for emergency management teams or the 
police… but just for going to the grocery store, I am not too comfortable with 
every move being followed...  I just think that because it’s a routine activity that 
it’s different and that because it’s items that I am purchasing it’s different, 
because these are items I am using and maybe I don’t want people to know what 
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I am using. I’m not saying that Waikiki [site of APEC] is different, but if there’s a 
large event or a lot of potential crimes that can occur there, maybe it’s a public 
safety issue, whereas I don’t really think that the grocery store is a public safety 
issue. I think [security at APEC] was about the public benefit or public good… 
whereas the grocery is for corporate good. 
Anuhea’s claim that neither she nor society at large is benefitting from access to this 
information again highlights an imbalance in power that emerges from this particular act 
of surveillance. The question becomes: How much information is actually needed to 
optimize the shopping experience or to protect the public, and what is actually being 
collected (for monetary value) that is not of use to the consumer or public safety?  
Solove (2011) points out that the major policy discourse in the United States right now 
frames privacy as something one must be willing to give up in order to have security. He 
emphasizes it is possible to have both, and that we must carefully evaluate security 
measures to ensure not only that they do not unnecessarily hinder privacy but that they 
also are effective.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined concerns about privacy and the emerging Internet of Things. 
Citizens’ reflection on changes in the key actors involved, information attributes, and 
principles of transmission revealed a number of points where existing norms about the 
collection and use of personal information will potentially be violated in everyday 
consumer transactions employing the Internet of Things.  
None of the participants in this study objected to the entire vision; in fact, there was 
some marked enthusiasm.  Although participants noted a variety of potential conflicts, 
all also mentioned specific contexts or applications that were desirable. Nalani 
describes this “tradeoff”:  
I mean it all seems awkward because it is letting go of so much but it also makes 
it so much easier. I feel it would just be taking getting used to and as long as I felt 
I still had control that I would come to accept it… Like you would get more control 
of your life by knowing all these things, but you’d kind of have to give up control, 
private information. You’ve got to give a little control to get a little control, I guess. 
Others also described these changes in terms of a tradeoff.  However, many of the 
concerns identified above – mining of medical data, invasive target advertising, loss of 
autonomy through marketing profiles or affect monitoring – appeared to tip the balance 
between consumer benefit and corporate gain: “Certain things are just not a good 
tradeoff – what small benefit can come of them could never outweigh the risk” (Anuhea).  
The ability to aggregate and mine data from a number of novel sources led to concerns 
information related to both one’s health and identity could be gathered and used to 
discriminate economically and politically. This new surveillance power creates an 
imbalance between the consumer and the corporation that may also impact individual 
autonomy. In particular, automated systems pushing recommendations or personal 
affect monitoring could constrain one’s options, thereby threatening autonomy. 
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4.1 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Several implications for policy arise from these findings. First, there are clearly some 
aspects of the Internet of Things in an everyday shopping context that are problematic 
for some consumers. Thus, some resistance is to be expected. Bennett (2008) notes, 
for example, the privacy advocacy organization CASPIAN, which focuses explicitly on 
supermarket consumers and stresses protests and boycotts in the United States. He 
also explores the possibility of this type of privacy advocacy becoming a global social 
movement.  Recalling Weber and Weber's (2010) questions about laws in the context of 
the Internet of Things, the time to create legal protections is before major problems 
arise. Neumann & Weinstein (2006) emphasize the importance of fostering a society-
wide discussion about the contexts and conditions within which RFID systems are 
acceptable.  
This is an especially difficult task, because many of the would-be applications are 
emotionally charged, and RFID capabilities and ostensible benefits are in some 
cases being hyped far beyond what is realistic. Yet it is such critical deliberations 
that will likely influence whether RFID will be deployed primarily in useful tools, or 
rather as identity shackles. (p. 136)  
This is particularly important to consider in light of Maile’s argument that the norm for 
privacy is still there but that people are just not aware of the many changes that are 
happening around us, and don’t think through the implications of their engagement with 
technology. Considering the possibility of resistance, an informed citizenry is critical not 
only from an ethical perspective, but from a business perspective as well. 
The International Telecommunication Union’s (2005) analysis of privacy in ubiquitous 
network societies emphasizes that three domains must be addressed in tandem when 
seeking privacy solutions: the sociological, technical, and regulatory. Public education 
and discourse about what is desired and acceptable is a key part of the sociological 
solution. From the technological side, the development of privacy enhancing 
technologies (PETS) and designing new systems with public input is emphasized.  
The regulatory domain is likewise complex -- for example, should the United States 
should consider omnibus privacy protection laws like those employed by the European 
Union, or would domain-specific laws prove more effective? It is clear that the present 
standard of industry self-regulation is not sufficient to constrain the threat to privacy. 
“There is little reason to expect that retailers, if left unbound by the force of law, would 
be immune to breaches of consumer trust…” (Hildner, 2006, p. 160). However, an 
omnibus privacy law may be unenforceable or lack the ability to target specific 
technologies or practices. Since much of the participants’ concern appears to be related 
to data storage, sharing, and analytics, one possibility is a general law for consumer 
data sharing coupled with sector-specific laws related to RFID (or other relevant 
technologies, as they arise). In the case of the consumer shopping experience, the 
balance is currently on the stores themselves to provide evidence showing that eye 
tracking or emotion recognition in public places is beneficial to consumers. 
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